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FROM THE EDITOR
The Islamic State group’s self-declaration of statehood was unprecedented in the history of 
Islamist terror groups. The appearance at least of a functioning territory, ruled under extreme 
salafi-jihadist interpretations of Islam, appealed to some for a wide variety of reasons. 
Some came for the excitement of warfare 
in the defence of the fledgling State.  
Some came to fulfil the religious dream 
of living in a caliphate. Some found 
themselves within its borders through 
no fault of their own. All this is now 
changing. The Islamic State’s territory 
is in decline. Squeezed on all sides, it is 
facing a future where it can no longer lay 
claim to statehood.
It would be naïve to assume that the 
decline of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq 
and Syria mean it will no longer play 
a significantly disruptive role in the 
region. But what impact will it have 
on outlying affiliates such as in Libya 
and Yemen? How will it affect the role 
of other countries, such as Iran, or the 
ideological confidence of its believers? In 
this issue of CREST Security Review we ask 
leading scholars from around the globe 
to consider perspectives on the question, 
‘what happens after IS?’
The problem of Islamist 
violence will not decline 
with IS; many of the 
underlying issues that 
contributed to its rise will 
still exist
One of the big questions concerns 
returning foreign fighters. Our guest 
editor for this issue, Cerwyn Moore, 
looks at the different roles transnational 
activists played in past conflicts, and  
the effect of policies dealing with their 
return (page 24). John Horgan (page 14) 
addresses the plight of children forced to 
fight for IS, and what the future holds for 
these young lives. 
Turning to al-Qaeda, Donald Holbrook 
(page 10) suggests that rumours of their 
demise have been greatly exaggerated, and 
considers how they might benefit from 
IS’s misfortune. Elisabeth Kendall focuses 
on the fortunes of al-Qaeda and IS in 
Yemen, and observes that this war-torn 
country could provide the ideal location 
for retreating IS fighters (page 4).
Other regionally-focused analyses of 
what could happen following the loss 
of IS’s territory are provided by George 
Joffé (Tunisia, page 8), Joas Wagemakers 
(Jordan, page 6), Michael Axworthy (Iran, 
page 7) and Wolfram Lacher (Libya, page 
9). A key point to come out of these 
accounts is that the problem of Islamist 
violence will not decline with IS; many 
of the underlying issues that contributed 
to its rise will still exist. Weak states, 
opportunist political collaboration 
with extreme Islamist ideologies, broad 
disaffection with elite and Western 
narratives, and many other problems 
will continue be an issue. And they will 
continue to enable an environment in 
which the violent identity politics of 
extremist Islamism will thrive.
A slightly more upbeat analysis comes 
from Christopher McDowell, who focuses 
on post-conflict Sri Lanka (page 26). His 
work reveals a positive effect of migration 
– in this case how the Tamil diaspora has 
helped avoid a return to civil war. In this 
issue, and away from our focus on IS, we 
also hear from Joe Uscinski (page 28), who 
tells us that conspiracy theories are for 
losers and Paul Taylor, who shows us what 
makes a group successful but also how we 
might help it fail (page 30).
As always, I love to hear your feedback 
on CSR and your suggestions on what we 
should cover in the future. Email me at 
m.d.francis@lancaster.ac.uk.
Matthew Francis 
Editor, CSR
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Which of these  
alternatives 
is most likely?
As for scenario one, given 
AQAP’s head-start in Yemen and 
the strong roots it has put down, 
it would be hard for IS point-blank 
to eclipse it. 
Regarding scenario two, the animosity 
required to generate direct in-fighting 
among Yemen’s militant jihadist  
groups would likely be less strong  
than the solidarity found in battling  
adversity and the common goal of waging 
war against perceived Shi’ites (Houthi 
rebels) and the West. Hence, scenario  
three is perhaps the most likely. 
As Yemen’s militant jihadists come under 
increasing military pressure from US air 
strikes, UAE-supported ground troops and 
Special Forces, they may increasingly bury 
their differences and join ranks such that 
we see the two groups start to blend. 
Whatever the case, one thing is certain. 
The longer the current war is allowed to 
drag on and regional voices and identities 
in Yemen remain unheeded, the more 
fertile the breeding ground for militant 
jihad and the greater the challenge to 
counter-terrorism efforts.
Dr Elisabeth Kendall is a Senior Research 
Fellow in Arabic and Islamic Studies at the 
Pembroke College University of Oxford.
IS ECLIPSES AQAP
First, if the number of IS mujahidin 
seeking sanctuary in Yemen turns out to 
be high, we could see IS start to rebuild in 
Yemen with the help of its existing local 
branches and by using the tribal contacts 
of returning Yemeni mujahidin, such that 
it ultimately eclipses AQAP.
IS CONFRONTS AQAP
Second, as IS numbers increase in Yemen, 
this could provoke more direct rivalry 
and confrontation between IS and AQAP. 
AQAP has been critical of IS’s premature 
announcement of a caliphate, its heavy 
handed governance and its disregard  
for civilian casualties. Likewise, IS 
was highly critical of AQAP’s weak 
implementation of Shari’a law in Mukalla 
and the surrounding areas under its 
control until late April 2016.
IS FIGHTERS JOIN AQAP
We could see IS mujahidin start to 
integrate with AQAP, swelling its numbers 
and influence and possibly pushing it 
to become even more extreme. Also, if 
AQAP’s leading ideologues – who tend 
to take a more gradualist approach than 
IS – continue to be picked off successfully 
by drone strikes, that could drive its rank 
and file to adopt the more radical brand of 
militant jihad espoused by IS.
Soon after the Saudi-led coalition began 
to launch air strikes on Yemen in March 
2015, AQAP was able to seize and hold vast 
swathes of territory in the South and East 
of the country. This lasted for almost a 
year until April 2016, when UAE Special 
Forces moved in.
However, it would be a mistake to 
imagine that AQAP has been defeated. 
During 2015, as Yemen’s Houthi rebels 
advanced and coalition bombs rained 
down on the West side of Yemen, AQAP 
was able to position its de facto ‘state’ as a 
haven of stability in the East. 
Operating out of the port city of Mukalla, 
it amassed significant financial resources 
and forged alliances with local militias. It 
implemented community development 
projects to shore up local support and 
adapted its global jihadist narratives to 
chime with local concerns. 
Whilst recent drone strikes and military 
operations have severely dented AQAP’s 
ability to operate openly, the kind of 
political and cultural capital it built up 
does not just melt away. 
Nor can the ideas that underpin its appeal 
be bombed into oblivion. Quite the 
reverse: the ongoing conflict in Yemen 
means that the appeal of militant Islamist
extremist groups like AQAP and, to a 
lesser extent IS, is likely to increase. 
Although the current conflict began as a 
domestic battle for territory, power and 
resources, the involvement of Sunni Saudi 
Arabia (on the side of President Hadi) 
and Iran (providing some support to the 
Houthi rebels, most of whom adhere to 
an offshoot of Shi’ism) fuels the sectarian 
narratives promoted by militant jihad. 
If one adds to this poisonous climate the 
rugged topography of Yemen, the security 
vacuum left by an absentee government 
residing in Riyadh, the weakening of tribal 
social glue as internally displaced people 
head East, rampant smuggling networks 
buoyed by the war economy and a vast 
and porous coastline, what is the result? 
An ideal sanctuary for mujahidin fleeing 
the heartlands of IS in Syria and Iraq. 
Although the number of Yemeni 
mujahidin returning from Syria and Iraq 
is unlikely to be high – after all, from 2015 
they had their own battlefront and did 
not need to travel to the Islamic State 
to wage jihad – the worry is that those 
who do return will bring their comrades 
with them. This could lead to several 
potential alternative scenarios, three of 
which are as follows.
YEMEN
ELISABETH KENDALL
Although several pockets of Islamic State (IS) operate within Yemen, it is not currently the dominant group 
in any region of the war-torn country, even within militant jihadist circles. the most active branches of IS in 
Yemen over recent months have been Wilayat Aden-Abyan and Wilayat al-Bayda, but even here it is unclear 
the extent to which IS atrocities are stoked or even designed by political opponents of President Hadi’s 
government to exacerbate discord. While IS in Yemen has carried out mass casualty attacks that have 
grabbed the headlines, it is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that has the upper hand in Yemen in 
terms of numbers, influence and appeal.
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This shift in IS’s policies can already 
be seen, but is likely to increase as the 
organisation loses more territory.  
From that point on, several scenarios  
are possible. 
One scenario is that IS continues to 
operate as an alternative to al-Qaeda, 
with its local branches in countries such 
as Libya and Nigeria. Given that both 
organisations will have roughly the same 
goals, they are likely to merge. Another 
scenario is that IS will dwindle and  
al-Qaeda will rise again. Still another 
option is that they will continue to be 
rivals, with IS continuing to try to set 
up a state. Any of these scenarios, and 
potentially others, are possible.
Given the tensions between al-Qaeda 
and IS and the inhibitions that some IS-
supporters are likely to have had  
about IS’s increasingly violent policies, 
any future efforts to set up an Islamic 
state are likely to be slightly different. 
There is a strong sentiment among 
many Jihadi-Salafi scholars and leaders 
that an Islamic state is a very good thing 
in principle, but that it should not be 
executed the way IS did it. 
This analysis of the situation may result 
in more careful ways of going about 
establishing an Islamic state the next 
time an opportunity arises. In other 
words: for Jihadi-Salafi critics of IS, the 
collapse of the latter has the potential to 
be a major ‘I told you so’ moment.
In Jordan, there is the additional 
difficulty of intra-Jihadi-Salafi rivalry. 
The two main Jihadi-Salafi scholars 
in the country (and probably in the 
world) – Abu Qatada al-Filastini and 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi – have been 
strongly against IS from the beginning. 
A large number of Jihadi-Salafi activists, 
however, disagree with them and still 
have fresh memories of the rivalry 
between their local hero – Abu Mus‘ab 
al-Zarqawi – and al-Maqdisi. While they 
see the former as a brave fighter who was 
willing to walk the talk, the latter is seen 
by them as an armchair jihadi who, when 
push came to shove, was not willing to 
support the jihad in Iraq. 
Moreover, al-Maqdisi often stressed the 
need to set up an Islamic state, rather 
than just engaging in attacks without 
lasting results. When IS came along, 
it seemed that a sustained effort to do 
what al-Maqdisi had always wanted – 
setting up an Islamic state – was finally 
being made, yet al-Maqdisi again refused 
to support it because he saw IS as the 
epitome of the “extremist” policies that 
he had always rejected. 
To some supporters of al-Zarqawi, 
this was proof that al-Maqdisi was 
hypocritical and not supportive of Jihadi-
Salafism. To al-Maqdisi himself, however, 
the fall of IS is likely to be seen as proof 
that he was right all along. Due to the 
extent of support for both positions, 
neither of these narratives is going to 
become entirely dominant in Jordan, 
with both co-existing uneasily for some 
years to come.
Dr Wagemakers’ research, at the University 
of Utrecht in the Netherlands, concentrates 
on Salafi ideology and groups, especially in 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian 
territories. 
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JOAS WAGEMAKERS
JORDAN
What one thinks about the motivation 
and stance of the Iranian regime affects 
perceptions of how it will react to the 
collapse of IS. The Iranian regime is 
often characterised as a hegemonic, 
expansionist power that supposedly uses 
Shi‘a communities elsewhere in the region 
as an instrument for its own ends.
This characterisation is not plausible for 
two good reasons. First, Iran is not set 
up as a militarist or expansionist state. 
Iranian defence spending was 2.3% of 
GDP in 2012 according to the Swedish 
International Peace Research Institute –  
a typical yearly figure over the last decade 
or more. This is comparable with the 
UK – although the Iranian figure could be 
adjusted up by as much as .75% to include 
spending on the Revolutionary Guards. 
Saudi Arabia spending in the same year 
was 7.7% (10.4% in 2014), Israel 5.7%, 
United Arab Emirates 4.8%. Outside of 
the region, the figure for the US was 4.2% 
(for the Soviet Union in the 1980s –  
a truly militaristic state with which Iran  
is sometimes compared - 15-17%). 
Second, if Iran were to seek to increase 
and exploit sectarian tensions for its 
own interests in an all-out intra-Muslim 
conflagration, Shi‘as and Iran would  
lose — Shi‘as are only 12-15% of  
Muslims worldwide.
The Iranian regime, like most others, 
wants (in priority order): 
1  To secure its own rule within Iran.
2  To protect Iranian national security.
3  To protect Iranian and (where feasible) 
Shi‘a interests outside Iran.
FOR SHI‘A MUSLIMS ... 
DEFEAT OF IS WILL ALSO  
BE A RELIEF. BUT THEY WILL 
BE ANXIOUS ABOUT WHAT 
HAPPENS NEXT
Iran’s defence and security posture is 
essentially defensive, but doesn’t always 
sound defensive. This is primarily 
down to the heritage of revolution and 
revolutionary rhetoric, especially under 
the former president Ahmadinejad. It is 
also due to Iran’s stance toward Israel.
Central to Iranian thinking (and any 
sound understanding of Iran’s position 
now) is the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Iran 
was invaded at a vulnerable moment, and 
it had few allies (only Syria, and Israel to 
some extent). 
By the end of the war Iran was  
isolated, and felt it was facing a global 
alliance of overt and covert enemies. 
The lesson drawn by Iranians was that 
Iran could defend itself and uphold self-
determination (important for Iranians 
given a long previous history of invasion 
and humiliation) but only from its own 
resources. It could not, and cannot trust 
external powers to help, or even to keep 
their word.
A further lesson from the Iran-Iraq war 
is relevant. In 1982, having regained the 
territory lost to Iraq at the beginning 
of the war, the Iranians had a choice 
– whether to accept a ceasefire, or to 
continue the war and remove the Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein from power. 
MICHAEL AXWORTHY 
IRAN
The fall of Islamic State (IS) would  
be a success for Iran. It would remove  
a dangerous enemy close to Iran’s borders.  
It would also strengthen Shi‘a allies in  
Iraq and help Syria as well as being one in  
the eye for regional rival, Saudi Arabia.  
But it would not be an opportunity  
to push for regional hegemony.
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IF THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS) IS DEFEATED AS A TERRITORIAL ENTITY, THE MAIN ASPECT THAT SETS  
IT APART FROM AL-QAEDA – ITS CLAIM TO BE A STATE WITH ACTUAL TERRITORY – WILL BE GONE. 
THIS MEANS IS WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO INVITE MUSLIMS TO JOIN ITS PROJECT IN SYRIA OR 
IRAQ, BUT WILL BE FORCED TO RELY ON TERRORIST ATTACKS AROUND THE WORLD. 
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After much debate, they chose the 
latter (encouraged by over-enthusiastic 
Revolutionary Guard officers). However, 
they overreached themselves, endured 
six more years of ultimately fruitless 
warfare with hundreds of thousands killed 
and more disabled. They were forced 
ultimately to accept a ceasefire on similar 
terms to that available in 1982. 
Most Iranians, regime supporters or not, 
now accept that the decision to continue 
the war in 1982 was a mistake. That 
lesson of the perils of overreach and the 
wisdom of a more defensive posture will 
be uppermost in the minds of the regime 
leadership as they consider Iraq after IS.  
For Shi‘a Muslims more widely in the 
region, defeat of IS will also be a relief. 
But they will be anxious about what 
happens next. They will be concerned as 
to whether the defeat of IS will deepen 
the bitterness of Sunnis in Iraq that made 
possible the rise of IS in the first place. 
The removal of IS will not remove the 
root causes of the rise of groups like 
al-Qaeda, Taliban, and IS in the region, 
and there is a risk that a new version of 
al-Qaeda or IS will bubble up.
Dr Michael Axworthy is a senior lecturer at 
the University of Exeter. From 1998-2000 
he was the Head of Iran Section in the UK’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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Many of the Tunisian recruits are located 
in Libya, despite the fact that Islamic State 
has been forced out of its stronghold in 
Sirte. Indeed, Libya is the ideal base, given 
its political chaos and the wide availability 
of arms from the stockpiles of the Qadhafi 
regime, freed up by the Libyan revolution 
in 2011. IS fighters have, as a result, been 
able to infiltrate Tunisia and launch the 
Ben Gardane (March 2016), Sousse (July 
2015) and Bardo Museum (March 2015) 
attacks, as well as a devastating attack 
on the presidential guard in Tunis in 
December 2015. 
Islamic State, however, is not the only 
extremist Salafi-jihadi actor in Tunisia. Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) has 
been able to infiltrate the central portion 
of the Algerian-Tunisian border around 
Djebal Chaamba where it has been active 
for the past four years. 
Another movement, based in Libya – 
Ansar al-Shari’a – has also infiltrated the 
country and probably been responsible for 
the assassination of at least two leading 
left-wing Tunisian politicians. It has, 
on occasion, collaborated with Islamic 
State, particularly in the training camp 
at Sabratha which was destroyed by the 
Americans in late 2015
In addition, a dissident faction of  
AQIM has been active along the Libyan  
border with Tunisia from where it 
launched an assault of a major gas  
facility at Tiguentourin that killed 39 
foreign hostages. 
It is, therefore, not clear that the 
disappearance of IS will mean the 
disappearance of violent extremism from 
Tunisia. An alternative vehicle for violent 
hostility exists and, despite the doctrinal 
disputes, the overriding objectives of IS, 
Ansar al-Shari’a, and AQIM are similar. 
Moreover, violent extremist protest 
will persist because the conditions that 
generated it – poverty, unemployment, 
lack of political and cultural authenticity 
of existing regimes – will persist too.
Nor has a driver for the emergence of 
either IS or AQIM been the failure of 
a ‘religious state infrastructure’. Both 
movements emerged in states that 
couldn’t accommodate or supress a 
challenge to their autocracy. Increased 
religion in the area emerged not because 
of greater religiosity but because it 
provided a culturally authentic rallying 
cry against the rhetoric of the state. 
The quest for social and cultural 
authenticity has become more important 
as a driver for change than the more 
mundane but nonetheless real economic 
and security failures of the state itself. 
This dynamic is aided by the tolerance 
previous regimes have shown for Salafism 
as an expression of the role of religion 
within social order. Its political role 
emerged only because of the parallel 
growth of Salafi-jihadism as an extremist 
version of the confrontation between 
state and social movement in the 
conquest for control of the state itself.
It is notable, too, that only Libya – an 
absolute autocracy – experienced a 
revolution, the implications of which 
are still unknown. By contrast, Tunisia 
evolved into democratic transition as a 
result of its previous status as a liberalised 
autocracy, as Algeria and Morocco had 
done so before.
The key to truly marginalising such 
movements is to ensure that moderate 
alternatives reflecting Islamic principle, 
such as the Ennahda movement, succeed.
GEORGE JOFFÉ
TUNISIA
Tunisia is the North African state with the largest absolute and 
proportional representation of its nationals within the ranks of the 
Islamic State (IS). There are, it is claimed, some 7,000 Tunisians 
enrolled in the movement, compared with an estimated 1,500 
Moroccans and between 100 to 200 Algerians. 
IS may continue to operate as a non-
territorial force in Libya, both in remote 
areas and in cities. Foreign fighters 
dispersed from former Libyan IS 
strongholds may move into neighbouring 
countries, including their countries of 
origin – such as Tunisia, Niger or Sudan. 
But in none of these countries will they 
find the environment that enabled IS to 
establish territorial control, as they did in 
Syria, Iraq and Libya during 2014-15. 
IS elements will therefore revert to a more 
conventional existence as jihadist groups. 
Whether they do so under the IS label or 
as al-Qaeda affiliates is largely irrelevant. 
The question, then, should be what the 
demise of IS as a territorial force and 
the change in wider conflict dynamics 
mean for Libya’s jihadist movement more 
generally. Jihadism is established in Libya, 
and deeply implanted in the social fabric 
of specific cities. 
Libyan IS affiliates were but the latest 
manifestation of Libyan jihadism, 
one born out of a particular set of 
circumstances that do not exist anymore 
– IS expansion in Syria and Iraq; free 
movement between Libya and Syria via 
Libyan airports and Turkey; political and 
territorial divisions in Libya that opened 
up space for IS. 
All the conditions are there for Libya’s 
jihadist movements to remain virulently 
active after the demise of the caliphate.
The jihadist subculture that has developed 
in certain Libyan cities will sustain the 
flow of recruits to jihadist groups for 
a long time to come. In the best-case 
scenario, the state will remain weak; it 
could plausibly also remain absent from 
large swathes of the country. 
Most importantly, ongoing conflicts 
continue to create opportunities for 
jihadist mobilisation, and lead political 
forces to strike tactical alliances  
with jihadists. 
Across the country, societal tolerance 
for jihadist movements has drastically 
receded as a result of the confrontations 
with IS in Benghazi, Sirte and elsewhere.
WOLFRAM LACHER 
LIBYA
During 2016, Islamic State (IS) was obliterated as a territorial force in Libya. IS fighters have 
scattered in small groups in remote desert areas, or gone underground as small cells in cities. 
They are unlikely to again attempt to openly establish control over cities or territory, since 
this will expose them to US or French airstrikes. They will also be unable to attract the large 
numbers of foreign fighters that had joined IS in its Libyan strongholds over 2015.
This represents a significant change from 
the situation prevailing in 2012 and 2013, 
when the group Ansar al-Shari'a operated 
openly amid local society. 
But the pendulum is now swinging 
towards the other extreme. An increasing 
range of political and military forces 
are adopting the discourse promoted 
by Egypt’s al-Sisi and his Libyan acolyte 
General Khalifa Haftar.
This discourse fails to differentiate among 
strands of political Islam. In Benghazi, this 
approach led to a convergence of interests 
between non-ideological groups, Ansar 
al-Shari'a and IS. If it is applied to western 
Libya, it will push many Islamists there 
closer to jihadists. A US shift towards 
dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
terrorist organisation would contribute to 
such a trend. 
The most acute of current dangers is 
the eruption of open conflict in Western 
Libya as Haftar and his allies seek to 
advance in the region. A war in the greater 
Tripoli area would likely see jihadists 
there emerge as a leading force in an  
anti-Haftar coalition, much as it happened 
in Benghazi. 
In Tripoli, such a war would likely 
last even longer and be much more 
destructive. It would provide a jihadist 
recruitment ground and fighting arena for 
many years to come. But a similar danger 
lurks in the potential eruption of conflict 
in south-western Libya as a result of an 
expansion of forces allied with Haftar.
Wolfram Lacher is a researcher at the  
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs in Berlin.
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And that requires such movements 
to understand and play the political 
participatory game with appropriate 
external support whilst recognising that 
they cannot co-opt or cooperate with 
their extremist correlates. 
That is a lesson that Ennahda in Tunisia 
and the Justice and Development Party in 
Morocco have already learned but their 
companion parties in Libya and Egypt 
have yet to realise.
Professor George Joffé specialises in the  
Middle East and North Africa and lectures  
on International Relations at the University  
of Cambridge.
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Children come to the Islamic State through at least  
five distinct pathways: 
1  Accompanying parents, guardians or older siblings  
who travel to the Islamic State 
2  Via local parents who willingly allow their children  
to become involved 
3 Via local parents from whom the children are forcibly removed 
4  Via local orphanages in areas where IS has assumed  
de-facto social control and 
5  Children who run away either alone, or with close friends, 
from local areas or even from abroad.
The result is what appears to be an institutionalised approach to 
socialising children into IS. The process turns them from passive 
bystanders into fully-fledged militants in six stages. Initially, 
children are seduced by the allure of involvement. They consume 
propaganda or witness IS’s ‘outreach activities’, where the 
movement’s goal is to project a positive, service-providing and 
popular face. 
Through schooling (under IS control) children have direct 
exposure to IS personnel for religious and educational 
indoctrination. This also marks an opportunity for selection, 
where IS recruiters choose some students for ‘Cubs’ training –  
30 to 60-day training camps where they are isolated from  
friends and family. 
A key quality of the child’s experiences here is subjugation.  
They are brutalised, disciplined and turned into soldiers. 
Graduates will encounter specialisation in a particular role (e.g., 
sniper, journalist, suicide bomber) before stationing for duty.
We analysed thousands of propaganda items issued by the Islamic 
State, and second-hand accounts of adult and child former 
members. Given the limited nature of that data, any attempts to 
understand this process must be seen as exploratory. 
What we have learnt, though, is that IS turns children into 
militants through a process of informal social learning.  
This confirms previous research on this process by the 
anthropologist Karsten Hundeide. Hundeide found, as in our  
IS data, that children are made to feel welcome, then adopt  
style and identity markers (e.g., language, uniform) of their new 
‘in-group’. 
The child then slowly learns to redefine the past, in order 
to readily accept a set of new values. This helps the child 
‘understand’ who the enemy is. Sacrifice and hardship (in this 
case through military training) are coupled with daily tests 
of loyalty and discipline. A final test of loyalty (e.g., raping, or 
executing a prisoner) affords the child the new status as a fully 
committed insider. This is gradual, systematic and more  
linear in nature than most accounts of adult involvement.
JOHN HORGAN 
THE LOST BOYS
Children are routinely targeted 
in conflict, both by state and 
non-state actors alike. 
By 2013, over 11,000 children were reported killed in the Syrian crisis. Equally disturbing has been the 
other side of such victimisation. Children are just as likely to be targeted for mobilisation into militant 
activity. The phenomenon of ‘child soldiers’ is far from new, but it’s an issue rarely considered in the 
context of terrorist conflict. However, in Syria and Iraq all armed groups, even groups supported by 
western governments, employ children in some capacity. 
The scale of child mobilisation into such groups is difficult to gauge. Nobody really knows how many 
children have been trained by the Islamic State. A conservative estimate would be that somewhere 
between 1,500 and 2,000 children graduated from Islamic State (IS) training between 1 January 2015 and 
31 December 2016. That’s more than two children a day.
THE EXPERIENCE OF ISLAMIC STATE CHILD SOLDIERS
CREST SECURITY REVIEW 
12
SPRING 2017
13
This project provides its students with all 
the facilities needed for their education, 
food, clothing, entertainment, and 
accommodation. A similar programme 
in Colombia, where more than half 
of FARC’s militants were recruited as 
children, also reports positive outcomes. 
However, other research highlights 
contrary views, including from some 
children who felt forced to deny their past 
and to accept an identity that they didn’t 
recognise to be theirs. 
Most programs involve the conflict 
ending and children being reunited 
with their families, an outcome which is 
strongly recommended in general, but 
which will not be viable in cases where 
the families were complicit with the 
children’s socialisation into IS in the  
first place. 
However we go forward, the success 
of rehabilitation programmes will 
depend on continued monitoring 
and advocacy, practical assistance 
for demobilisation and 
rehabilitation, effective use of 
political and military leverage 
by international actors, and an 
uncompromising commitment 
by local, national, and international 
authorities to hold perpetrators 
accountable. The scale of the challenge 
facing children affected or displaced by IS 
is staggering. 
The danger of recidivism is high if 
programmes fall short in rehabilitating 
children. Three-month programmes that 
merely focus on disarmament are too 
short to guarantee any type of sustainable 
rehabilitation; much longer programmes 
will be needed if children who have been 
in Islamic State are to be successfully 
rehabilitated. But, sadly, it’s clear we have 
a long way to go in understanding how to 
create an effective rehabilitation program 
for the thousands of children mobilised by 
Islamic State.
John Horgan is Professor of  
Global Studies and Psychology at 
Georgia State University, Atlanta. 
This article is based on his research  
with Mia Bloom on children’s mobilisation 
into violent extremist organisations  
and is supported by research grant  
ONR N00014-15-1-2049 under the  
auspices of the US Office of  Naval Research. 
The views and conclusions contained in this 
document are those of the authors and should 
not be interpreted as representing the official 
policies, either expressed or implied, of the 
Department of Defense, the Office of Naval 
Research or the US Government.
What can we learn from other attempts to deal  
with former child soldiers? 
Although we can draw on previous experiences of dealing with child soldiers, few 
‘best practices’ have been identified from evaluations of such programs that can 
readily be harnessed for dealing with child returnees from IS. However, insights 
from research in Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Pakistan can inform our approach to 
children who have been involved in terrorism. 
One child-centred program in Pakistan’s Swat Valley 
successfully reintegrated 156 youth back into their 
communities between 2010 and 2014
The territorial decline of the Islamic State 
means there is an urgent need to develop 
solutions to the problems faced by these 
children. Based on our understanding of 
child soldiers in other conflicts, we can 
make some basic assumptions. 
Most importantly, we need to understand 
child socialisation into the Islamic State 
as a type of victimisation. Our six-stage 
model captures how IS has mastered and 
institutionalised child abuse.
However, although accounts of children’s 
experiences with the Islamic State 
naturally leads us to characterise them 
as passive victims, the reality is more 
complex, and equally unsettling.
From a psychological perspective, 
we will need to address the effects of 
indoctrination and of trauma. In previous 
research on former child militants in Sri 
Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), children were found to have been 
explicitly taught how to ‘hate the enemy’.
In the case of IS, young people have been 
subjected to a level of de-individuation 
and ‘identity reshaping’ so profound that 
it exceeds in focus and intensity what 
most adult recruits to IS experience. 
Some IS children may be more overtly 
‘ideological’ than others, in the sense 
of being able to articulate or parrot 
ideological content. Ideology remains 
very poorly understood in children and 
adults alike. Studies of adult terrorists 
typically view ideology in one of two ways: 
as a precursor to involvement in violent 
extremism (e.g., a stepping stone) or as a 
by-product of involvement (i.e., whereby 
a person becomes more ideological after 
being recruited). 
After listening to accounts of child 
recruitment, it might seem logical to 
assume that children are more ‘vulnerable’ 
to ideological commitment. But though 
a child may parrot ideological content, 
that doesn’t necessarily mean that they 
understand it. And in any event, that may 
not necessarily be the most important 
point; the more significant qualities 
of childhood trajectories into violent 
extremism are probably their social and 
psychological aspects.
THE CHALLENGE OF REHABILITATION
To mitigate recidivism, we will need a way 
of determining whether, how, and when 
children are prepared to re-enter civil 
society. The failure to properly address 
this results in many demobilised child 
soldiers becoming even more disturbed.
A further problem surrounds ‘stateless’ 
children, born of foreign fighters and  
most likely of rape. As highlighted by 
Human Rights Watch, these children do 
not have identification papers or birth 
certificates and as such are not able to 
prove their nationality. 
As well as discrimination and lack of 
access to resources, history also shows us 
that these children are more vulnerable to 
prostitution, trafficking, and recidivism.
Trauma will also be 
a key issue 
IS children will have lost people close to 
them, seen dead and wounded bodies, 
killed or violently assaulted others, and 
faced death themselves. Such experiences 
have profound and long-lasting 
psychological impact. 
Studies of former LTTE child militants 
show they exhibited an array of psyc-
hiatric conditions including depression, 
post-traumatic stress disorder and severe 
psychosis. Sadly, the same will be true of 
many of those leaving IS.
Conflict-related symptoms persist in the 
longer term where insufficient attention 
is paid to issues experienced after the 
conflict. We need to pay attention to  
these and not just war-related trauma and 
post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Issues such as personal loss during the 
conflict, family abuse or neglect and the 
stigma of association with the conflict 
all lead to the internalisation of negative 
psychological symptoms over time. 
Each case will, however, need to be 
assessed individually. Children who 
return from the Islamic State will have 
had different experiences, and will 
present different challenges. Some will 
be traumatised, others will not. For 
children involved in militancy,  
their accounts will vary considerably. 
Former IS Cubs will need practical as well 
as psychological support. Access to quality 
education, vocational and life skills 
training (to help prepare for civilian life 
and jobs) are essential, as is access to and 
use of interim care centres to assist with 
the reintegration process.
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Zawahiri’s statements over these five years evokes fundamental 
debates about the appropriate limits and boundaries of violent 
protest within Sunni Muslim revolutionary movements. 
The central question in these debates concerns the ‘correct’ (from 
legalistic, functional and practical standpoints) form of militancy. 
Zawahiri has been on both sides of this argument, defending 
more profound, ruthless, and indiscriminate campaigns of 
violence as well as making the case for stricter adherence to 
limitations and breaks on the use of force. As he risked being 
outflanked by IS, he became firmly placed in the latter camp.
Why does this matter? If IS continues to disintegrate, its 
organisational components may begin to resemble those 
of al-Qaeda more closely with a central hub sponsoring 
suborganisations whilst promoting attacks in its name 
throughout the world. This is a heterogeneous universe. Many 
options exist for those seeking militant Islamist solutions in the 
MENA region. Within this extremist fringe, moreover, Zawahiri 
has responded to the rise of IS by situating himself and al-Qaeda 
in ‘the middle’ in the hope that this will provide some of the 
key ingredients for its future survival. At the same time, he has 
reiterated support for mass-casualty attacks, and self-starter 
attacks against a range of targets in the West. IS’s organisational 
decline may alter the shape of Islamist-inspired militancy, but it 
will not eliminate the threat it poses.
Donald Holbrook is a lecturer in politics, international relations and 
religion at the University of Lancaster.
Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, Zawahiri 
has published over seventy statements, books, and other 
communiques where he set out his vision for the Middle East, 
North Africa (MENA), and the Muslim Ummah as a whole.
Over time he has increasingly focused on how to respond to IS’s 
jihad. He has sought to do so by framing IS’s rise as a temporary 
surge of illegitimate excess, akin to the ill-fated Armed Islamic 
Group of Algeria (GIA) or perhaps even the original outcasts, the 
Khawarij. He has also sought to prepare, rhetorically, for a more 
multipolar jihadi universe where there would be opportunities to 
reclaim ground (ideological as well as physical) lost to IS. 
Three interrelated themes appear to 
define what Zawahiri has sought to do in 
these statements
First, there was a preoccupation with succession to the vanguard 
that had been chosen to lead the jihad. Here, Zawahiri responded 
to IS’s challenge to his leadership by reiterating the preeminent 
position of the Afghan ‘Islamic Emirate’ and by questioning the 
legitimacy of IS’s leaders, who he presented as oath breakers  
who desired power and glory.
Second, Zawahiri articulated the need to continue the 
momentum which ensured al-Qaeda remained relevant in 
people’s minds. He sought to illustrate al-Qaeda as a resolute 
jihadi force by emphasising both intangibles, such as ideas and 
the sustenance of a social movement, alongside tangibles, such as 
attacks against Western targets.
Third, there was a need to offer a semblance of continuity from a 
first generation of leaders, to which Zawahiri himself belonged, 
and a second generation that would ensure the organisation’s 
future relevance. 
Through his output, Zawahiri sought to chart a course within 
the jihadi universe that saw al-Qaeda continue to build upon its 
mode of jihad. This downplayed, in relative terms, sectarianism 
and emphasised the striking of US and western interests in ways 
that were fundamentally more targeted, and arguably more 
sustainable, than those adopted by IS. This would present a more 
fruitful model which future leaders could adopt and build upon. 
DONALD HOLBROOK
THE ISLAMIC STATE 
AND AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI’S 
‘ALTERNATIVE JIHAD’
As al-Qaeda approaches its thirtieth anniversary, many now seem to be 
retracting the obituaries they drafted when the organisation was being 
eclipsed by the rise of the Islamic State group (IS). Of course, al-Qaeda’s 
death has been announced prematurely on occasions in the past. But the 
group has always managed to survive in some form, morphing at times 
into a looser entity, illustrating the agility and conceptual ambiguity that 
has been key to its survival. Yet its current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has 
generated little excitement. IS’s propaganda described him as ‘senile and 
deviant’. More generous accounts present him as intelligent, humble, but 
ill-suited for leadership.
A DIFFERENT MODE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF ‘APPROPRIATE’ VIOLENCE
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ASSESSINGTHE THREAT
During the early phases of its growth, 
IS made significant territorial gains, and 
amassed considerable resources. Ignoring 
these resources in an analysis of its 
territorial decline would lead to a skewed 
picture of the threat that the group 
continues to pose, both inside and outside 
its territories. 
Consquently, it may be more helpful 
to assess IS using criteria developed by 
political scientist Martha Crenshaw in 
her 2001 study of terrorism in Algeria. 
According to Crenshaw, to claim ‘that 
terrorism is successful […] presumes that 
terrorism is instrumental and that the 
strategy behind it can be discovered;’ 
whereas ‘to be effective, terrorism need 
merely produce a decided or decisive 
effect, which may not reflect the original 
intent of the actor.’
If the objective of IS is to build a state 
on the ashes of all other states, as its 
leaders claim, then the group has failed 
in terms of both criteria: success and 
effectiveness. However, in statements 
and communiques produced in 2016, 
the leadership of IS had already started 
to establish a narrative of continuity, 
since they referred back to Abu Mus‘ab 
al-Zarqawi, who first led the group that 
evolved into IS. 
It was clear that this evolving narrative 
was communicated so as to position and 
sustain IS in the wider jihadi universe, 
despite significant losses. At the same 
time, this positioning also initiated a 
discussion about evolving strategies which 
the group might employ should it fail to 
establish a caliphate. 
‘ENGRENAGE’:  
A FUTURE NON-STRATEGY?
Regardless of the original intention of IS 
leaders, the group’s official publications 
are making it clear that it would be 
content for its soldiers, supporters, 
and sympathisers to inflict harm and 
disruption on all the enemies of the 
Islamic State, particularly Europeans and 
Americans. The former IS spokesperson, 
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (killed in 
August 2016), encouraged Western IS 
supporters to carry out attacks in Europe 
and the United States, including against 
civilians, even claiming that these could 
be more important than attacks in Iraq 
and Syria.
Islamic State’s terror campaign does  
not need to adhere to a centralised 
strategy or single target. So long as 
enthusiasts are able to deliver violence, 
then a non-strategy can possibly be 
made to look like a strategy. This fits the 
concept of ‘engrenage’ that Crenshaw 
discussed, referring to an inescapable 
chain of violence, whereby terrorism 
becomes an end in itself, rather than a 
means to an end.
In the context of IS, now that it is 
progressively losing control over the 
territories it once governed, the group 
would likely welcome ‘engrenage’ even if 
the attacks are carried out by freelancers 
over whom it has no direct control. So 
long as such attacks keep generating a 
cycle of violence and are carried out in 
the name of IS, the group will take credit 
for them in order to project influence 
and so as to feed into its own narrative of 
resilience and sustainability.
ABATEMENT?
If there is no end to the cycle of IS 
violence in the near future, is it likely 
to abate? And what factors might cause 
such an abatement? As noted earlier, 
the capture of cities by IS enabled the 
group to accumulate massive resources. 
If these resources are put in the service 
of terrorism, and since mounting 
terrorist operations is relatively cheap, 
then IS will be well-positioned to deliver 
indiscriminate operations against the 
world community for a long time to come. 
However, if the group continues to 
prolong its hold on territories and puts 
some of its accumulated capital in the 
service of governance, however poor in 
quality it may be, then this would have a 
damaging impact on the longevity of IS  
as a terrorist group.
Alongside its material resources, IS also 
requires fighters to carry out attacks. 
As a group, it built its appeal to foreign 
fighters on its early military successes on 
the battlefield. It is doubtful, then, that IS 
will continue to effectively attract or even 
manage foreign fighters, given ongoing 
territorial losses. Indeed, there has already 
been a sharp decline in the numbers 
attempting to reach IS. 
It should not be forgotten, however,  
that the group emerged out of the  
failure of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and unless 
underlying issues are addressed in the 
region, it is likely that the message of IS 
will continue to resonate in some form. 
Nelly Lahoud is Senior Fellow for Political 
Islamism at the International Institute  
for Strategic Studies –  
Middle East.
NELLY LAHOUD 
WHAT NEXT FOR ISLAMIC STATE? 
The size of the Islamic State (IS) and its ability to project a narrative as a state-building entity peaked 
before the group celebrated its one-year anniversary in 2015. Although IS’s influence has inspired terrorist 
operations outside its borders, including in Europe and the United States, the group has been losing 
territory in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. How then should we assess the threats emanating from IS in light of the 
failure of its core narrative, namely the establishment of a functioning caliphate?
ISLAMIC STATE’S TERROR 
CAMPAIGN DOES NOT 
NEED TO ADHERE TO A 
CENTRALISED STRATEGY OR 
SINGLE TARGET... SO LONG 
AS ENTHUSIASTS ARE ABLE 
TO DELIVER VIOLENCE
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THE ‘REMAINERS’
There are a variety of reasons for 
remaining in a conflict zone, some 
difficult to appreciate from afar. For 
example, there will be groups of foreign 
fighters who will be scattered, injured or 
for that matter traumatised – hampering 
their capacity to leave the conflict zone. 
Routes out of a conflict zone may be 
blocked, or fraught with danger. As a 
result, some combatants may switch 
allegiance to other groups or movements, 
with different aims. 
Some foreign fighters will, of course, 
choose to fight to the death. Others 
may think the only route out is through 
amnesties, which offer temporary respite 
as insurgent networks splinter and 
collapse. However, amnesties may favour 
local fighters, further ostracising foreign 
combatants captured in theatre.  
Those foreign fighters who may remain 
in the conflict zone will find a dwindling 
support network, forcing them to operate 
covertly, and rely on smaller groups of 
supporters. We know from the conflicts 
in Chechnya that foreign fighters who 
remained were captured or killed, having 
been betrayed by former allies. 
Others who remained sometimes married 
locals, affording them both a measure of 
protection from clans and enabling them 
to retain bonds of trust and blend in to 
local communities. 
This illustrates the uncertain 
environment in which foreign fighters 
operate: an issue that will apply to Islamic 
State (IS) too. 
Even if IS’s foreign activists do manage to 
leave the frontlines, their options will be 
limited. Governments continue to block 
travel routes – making further movement 
more uncertain. Over time, small groups 
of foreign fighters are often arrested in 
the environs of conflict zones – as rolling 
waves of counter-terrorism are used to 
detain suspects. Others seek safety in 
ungoverned spaces, searching out new 
fronts to continue their chosen path. 
The ‘Afghan Arabs’, fresh from their battle 
with the Soviets in the 1980s, are a prime 
example of this phenomenon. Many 
eventually went on to form al-Qaeda. 
THE ‘LEAVERS’
There is a risk that returning foreign 
activists will engage in violence when 
they return home. The proportion of 
activists willing to do so depends on a 
combination of organisational intent 
and opportunity. Not all conflicts lead to 
similar levels of violence from returning 
foreign fighters.
The wars in Bosnia and Iraq did not lead 
to significant levels of returning foreign 
fighters plotting in their home countries. 
However, fighters involved in the conflict 
in Afghanistan from 2004 onwards 
generated numerous plots. 
In the short-term, violence associated 
with returnees will continue to be linked 
to plotting and material support from 
inside the conflict zone. The Paris and 
Brussels attackers provide an example of 
this type of attack. 
These types of returnees come back 
with the express purpose of carrying 
out attacks. Whether this kind of plot 
can continue depends on the extent to 
which IS is able to maintain some kind of 
control or influence over returnees. 
Most involvement by foreign fighters in 
terrorism is linked to interaction with an 
entity, like IS, that has declared intent and 
which has some enabling capacity. The 
ability of groups to communicate outside 
of the conflict zone may contribute to 
surges in activity. 
Propaganda distributed via social media 
platforms has proved to be an important 
enabling factor in the mobilisation of 
fighters from Europe and has the potential 
to encourage ongoing engagement in 
violence.
French experience suggests that plotting 
activity in the short to medium term is 
associated with ‘short fuses’ and ‘slow 
burners’. ‘Short fuses’ are those activists 
tasked upon return to act, and ‘slow 
burners’ are those who might be willing 
to act depending on the circumstances. 
These circumstances are difficult to 
predict in advance but are linked to their 
social networks and external events.
In the longer term, the involvement of 
returnees is contingent on their level 
of continued engagement in networks 
supportive of violence. These can include 
the original network that facilitated their 
departure, or new networks formed in the 
conflict zone or prison. 
For example, the arrest of members of the 
Buttes-Chaumont group initially appeared 
to have disrupted their engagement in 
violence, but they remained in contact 
and acquired new members. One 
subsequently travelled to Yemen, some 
to Tunisia and then to Syria, while others 
attacked in France. 
An additional factor is whether or not 
there is a terrorist group providing 
ideological or material support for a 
terrorist act. 
ASSESSING THE THREAT
The ability of returnees to act depends 
on the capacity of a state to triage them 
and assess who may or may not pose a 
threat. This assessment role is further 
complicated by three factors specific to 
the Syrian conflict. 
The first is the sheer volume of current 
returnees. This number may grow as 
fighters still in the combat zone also seek 
to return. 
Second, they have an unusually diverse 
demographic profile. Previous conflicts 
had a returnee demographic that was 
overwhelmingly military age males.  
The Syria conflict has military age males 
but also large numbers of females and 
children. 
Third, a returnee is not obliged to 
return to their state of origin, they could 
choose to travel to a third state. France, 
for example, could see not only former 
French residents and nationals return but 
also fighters from other French speaking 
countries – Tunisia and Morocco and 
also Belgium. Spain, the Netherlands and 
Belgium face a similar risk.
France could also see increased flows of 
Chechens given that 7-8% of those who 
left France to fight for IS were also of 
North Caucasian origin. No European 
state has previously been faced with such 
a complex situation. 
There is no straight forward way to 
assess how individuals will behave upon 
return, particularly in the long-term. 
Past evidence suggests a small minority 
engage in violence, but there is no way to 
differentiate between those who will and 
those who will not. 
Four approximate indicators appear 
to be: whether the individual remains 
engaged in a network that continues to 
reinforce and maintain the fighter’s belief 
and adherence to plotting; if returnees 
participate in a social network that 
supports and reinforces beliefs about 
the acceptable nature of violence; if the 
individual is able to acquire logistical 
support from within this network; and 
lastly, if a returnee has a connection to a 
jihadi veteran or entrepreneur willing to 
facilitate an attack. 
Finally, the role of returnees is not 
confined to acts of violence in their  
home country. 
Historically they have also constituted a 
cadre of veterans who, in the event of a 
new conflict, are able to mobilise or vouch 
for new foreign fighters seeking to travel 
abroad.
Timothy Holman is a PhD candidate at the S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
and works in the Office of the Prosecutor, 
International Criminal Court. Cerwyn Moore 
is a CREST researcher and a senior lecturer 
at the University of Birmingham. The views 
expressed herein are solely the authors’ and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the 
Prosecutor or the ICC.
TIMOTHY HOLMAN AND CERWYN MOORE 
REMAINERS AND LEAVERS: 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS AFTER THE 
ISLAMIC STATE
While much has been written about ‘foreign fighters’, less attention has 
been paid to what happens to activists who have travelled to participate 
in different conflicts when hostilities wither and end. What drives 
decisions to remain and fight, or leave for home? And what options are 
available to those who choose or are forced to leave? 
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In October 2007, veteran Chechen field 
commander Dokka Umarov announced 
the establishment of the Caucasus 
Emirate (IK), finalising the victory 
of the North Caucasus insurgency’s 
Islamist wing over nationalist-separatists 
in its historic Chechen core. This 
self-proclaimed jihadist state united 
insurgent groups across the region, 
albeit without controlling any territory. 
Yet, in December 2014, the IK started to 
fracture, and a combination of deaths and 
defections meant that, by late 2015, it had 
largely ceased to exist as a functioning 
organisation.
The Syrian conflict undoubtedly 
accelerated the decline of the IK. 
Reflecting divisions in Syria – among 
both North Caucasian groups and in 
the broader jihadist community – the 
IK found itself split between the Islamic 
State (IS) and its opponents. While the 
IK’s senior leadership sided with al-Qaeda, 
many commanders and rank-and-file 
rebels favoured IS. 
As a result, the IK experienced large-scale 
defections, and IS formalised its advance 
into the region in July 2015 with the 
establishment of the Caucasus Wilayah 
(IS/CW) as an official province of its 
caliphate. The IK’s already precarious 
position was further undermined by 
security service operations that killed 
many of its remaining leaders.
The downward trend in violence 
in the North Caucasus, however, 
predates the large-scale involvement 
of North Caucasians in Syria, with two 
contradictory processes contributing 
to the IK’s initial decline. First, the 
authorities from 2010 onwards pursued 
several soft policies, including local 
commissions to rehabilitate insurgents 
and increased engagement with Salafi 
communities. Extremist ideologies 
always seek to tap into and shape existing 
grievances, and addressing some of these 
grievances undermined the insurgency’s 
support base and recruitment potential. 
Second, the security services increased 
the pressure on the insurgency prior and 
subsequent to the 2014 Winter Olympics. 
While this signalled the end of the soft 
measures – and is arguably one of the 
reasons why the long-term foundations 
for stability have not been laid – increased 
security measures made it much more 
difficult for the insurgency to operate. 
In both cases, changes in the IK’s 
operating environment had a significant 
impact on its appeal.
A further explanation for the failure of the 
IK lies in the reasons for its proclamation 
and subsequent ideological evolution. 
The insurgency needed an ideology that 
could appeal to both the broader North 
Caucasus region and the next generation 
of insurgents. Over time, that ideology 
shifted from a clear hierarchy of enemies 
to a blurred focus displaying an increasing 
interest in international affairs. 
With each shift, the leadership sought to 
expand the insurgency’s support base – 
first from Chechnya to the broader region, 
then to Russia’s Muslims, and then to 
the global jihadist community – because 
its original support base was no longer 
sufficient. Ideological change was heavily 
influenced by practical considerations.
The final reason for the IK’s demise 
was that, by 2011, it had lost many 
of its indigenous ideological leaders. 
Existing research shows that leadership 
decapitation can produce mixed results, 
a conclusion supported by evidence from 
the North Caucasus: whereas violence 
declined sharply with the loss of some 
leaders, it increased significantly with the 
loss of others. 
However, the blurring of enemy 
hierarchies and the decline of the 
insurgency both appear to begin with the 
loss of key indigenous ideologists. It was 
these people who were able to translate 
global narratives to local audiences, and  
to give the IK a distinct identity.  
While their messages continued to 
resonate posthumously, without  
them the IK struggled to respond to 
changing circumstances.
Pledging allegiance to IS has not 
revitalised the North Caucasus 
insurgency. By late 2016, the IS affiliate, 
Caucasus Wilayah, found itself in much 
the same degraded state as the IK a year 
earlier. Caucasus Wilayah leaders sought 
to redirect the emotional appeal of the 
caliphate back into the insurgency, but 
largely appear to have been unsuccessful. 
The decline of the North Caucasus 
insurgency, and the failure of IS to 
translate support for its ideology into 
significant mobilisation on behalf 
of a branch of its claimed caliphate, 
demonstrate the importance of viewing 
ideological appeal not in isolation, but as 
continually interacting with operational 
circumstances. And the lack of indigenous 
ideologists on the ground constitutes a 
major obstacle to an insurgency’s ability to 
rejuvenate itself.
MARK YOUNGMAN 
LESSONS FROM THE DECLINE 
OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS 
INSURGENCY
The decision by the Islamic State (IS) group to proclaim a ‘caliphate’ in June 
2014 was a watershed moment in the history of jihadism, but it was far from the 
first attempt at jihadist state-building. Examining the reasons for the failure of 
one such project, the Caucasus Emirate (IK) in Russia’s North Caucasus, and 
the demise of the regional insurgency under the banners of both IK and IS can 
help us better understand the relationship between a group’s ideology and its 
composition and operating environment.
Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded 
doctoral researcher at the University 
of Birmingham.
Dreaming has an important role in 
Islam, and Islamic State (IS) use dream 
interpretation narratives for conversions, 
propaganda, legitimation and inspiration. 
The former flagship magazine of IS, 
Dabiq (now Rumaniya), contained in its 
last publication a narrative concerning 
a fighter who was reported as seeing 
his martyrdom in a prior dream. Also 
published in Dabiq were three dreams of 
the Brussels bomber, Khalid El Bakraoui. 
These included his first prison 
conversion, his IS inspired dream 
battle fighting alongside the Prophet 
Mohammed, and his own ultimate 
mountain-top deliverance. Such 
martyrdom dream accounts have 
a long history in Islamic countries 
and interpretive dream practices are 
contained in various accounts of the life 
of the Prophet Muhammad.
Dreams are not just something that are 
received, they can also be sent. Dream 
transmission by authorised teachers, 
Shaykhs, is an enduring trope in Sufi 
Islam. One Cyprus-based Naqshbandi 
Shaykh I interviewed confirmed that he 
sometimes sent his followers spiritual 
guidance in night dreams. Outside of Sufi 
Islam, there are two notable accounts of 
night dreams being sent and used to call 
followers to jihad. 
Dreams were reported as an important 
recruitment strategy in bringing many 
young women to fight in the siege of 
the Red Mosque in Islamabad in 2007. 
Even more extraordinarily, hundreds 
of the followers of the leader of the 
failed 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque 
in Mecca, Juhayman bin Seif al-Uteybi, 
were reported to have had dreams of his 
brother-in-law being the true Mahdi – the 
prophesied redeemer of Islam.
Leadership is an important theme in 
dream accounts. For example, accounts 
attributed to Mullah Omar are well 
known to have authorised, inspired and 
validated the rise of the Taliban leader.  
They also helped secure and legitimate 
his position. 
DREAMS CAN DISTURB AS 
WELL AS INSPIRE
In 2016, a dream of al-Baghdadi being 
instructed by the Prophet Mohammed 
to leave Mosul apparently caused 
consternation amongst IS fighters in 
the city. This dream was publicised on 
pro-Assad and Kurdish websites, possibly 
as part of a counter strategy designed to 
taint al-Baghdadi.
Dreams are also not restricted to leaders 
who live. The spiritual reputation of the 
leader is important and a reclusive figure 
such as al-Baghdadi may be less of a 
dream focus than Osama bin Laden.  
On Twitter, there are accounts of the 
now dead IS military leader, Omar 
al-Shishani, who often courted media 
coverage, being dreamt about heroically 
by his followers.
Dreams and their interpretation in Islam, 
and likewise by IS, are an accepted way 
of conjuring a hopeful future and a way 
of understanding and recovering from 
defeat. IS Twitter accounts providing 
dream interpretation have been highly 
used amongst IS networks. 
For instance, dream accounts by IS on 
Twitter help explain defeat by revealing 
a critique of IS for not helping the poor 
enough and wasting food. The change in 
dream subjects can also be significant.
Dream accounts of glorious martyrdom 
in recent Dabiq publications could  
well have been intended to inspire 
extremists to undertake jihad and 
violence in the West. 
Whether they are felt to be transmitted  
or received, night dreams and visions 
are likely to continue to play an  
important role in the cultural tapestry 
of Islamic State fighters, regardless of 
territorial losses.
Dr Iain Edgar is an emeritus reader at the 
University of Durham.
IAIN EDGAR 
AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: 
THE PLACE OF NIGHT DREAM 
INSPIRATION AND PROPAGANDA
Though non-Muslims might dismiss dreams as irrelevant, dreaming often plays a significant role  
in Islamic life, including for Islamist extremists. Iain Edgar explains how dreams have influenced  
decisions and shaped perceptions in jihadist campaigns.
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While much of the analysis of those 
who travel to overseas conflicts focuses 
on foreign fighters, it is important to 
recognise different forms of transnational 
activism. In past conflicts, just as in Syria, 
ideologically-inspired activism took many 
forms. It was not uncommon for medical 
specialists including nurses, or writers 
and artists involved in fund-raising, to 
travel to join the International Brigades in 
1930’s Spain. Then, in the latter part of the 
1940’s, dozens of British volunteers – from 
many different walks of life – travelled to 
fight in the 1948 Palestine war. Many also 
volunteered to participate in post-conflict 
nation-building. 
In 1870 the UK government passed 
the Foreign Enlistment Act to prevent 
volunteers travelling to participate in 
foreign conflicts. The act was deployed 
again in the 1930s, in a largely symbolic 
attempt to prevent participation in the 
Spanish Civil War. By the late 1940s, 
the act was again discussed as a way to 
regulate British volunteers travelling to 
engage in Israeli state-building efforts. 
More recently, the initial rallying cry in 
Syria focused on providing charitable 
and medical support for refugees fleeing 
violence in the Middle East. 
As the conflict became more entrenched, 
local groups sought to raise support 
through new information and 
communication networks, including 
Twitter. This produced forms of activism 
that were both physical (providing medical 
support) as well as virtual (providing 
moral and ideological support). 
The declaration of Islamic State’s caliphate 
in August 2014 sparked a different wave of 
activism, mobilising those who travelled 
to participate in what they saw as state-
building. Specialists with engineering or 
medical training were joined by those who 
saw migration as a religious obligation. 
Some travelled as families – seeking the 
promise of a life within an Islamic state. 
IS started to introduce formal structures 
of governance, adding to the façade of a 
legitimate state. 
Just as there are many reasons why people 
became transnational activists, so there 
needs to be a variety of responses to those 
who return from overseas conflict zones. 
In the case of the Spanish Civil War, even 
those who fought for the fascists were 
not necessarily imprisoned when they 
returned. 
The author Peter Kemp went almost 
seamlessly from Franco’s nationalists to 
the UK’s fledgling Special Operations 
Executive. His experiences in Spain were 
used to support the UK during the war. 
At the other extreme, when the 1980s 
conflict in Afghanistan finished, some 
of the Afghan Arabs travelled back 
to their homes as heroes, while small 
numbers sought out new places to wage 
jihad. However, some former activists 
– including fighters – faced uncertain 
futures, barred from return to their own 
countries. This was especially true of 
Egyptian militants. 
The threat of arrest had the indirect  
effect of creating a new clandestine  
milieu – out of which a new movement,  
al-Qaeda, emerged.
The options for returning fighters who 
choose to desist from violent activism 
are clearly mixed: some may be detained, 
arrested or imprisoned, while others 
might enter rehabilitation programmes 
in their home countries. However, the 
options for those returning volunteers 
who were activists but not combatants are 
even more uncertain. 
This group of returnees includes male 
and female activists or, as John Horgan 
notes in his article in this edition of CSR, 
child soldiers. The many forms of activism 
– and activists - linked to the conflicts 
in Syria and Iraq will require innovative 
thinking to address a new generation of 
returnees. 
CERWYN MOORE  
TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTIVISM THROUGH 
THE AGES
Although transnational activism has changed dramatically as a result 
of globalisation, the process of travelling to participate in conflicts in 
different parts of the world is not new. There are many reasons why 
people decide to travel to participate in activism, and these reasons 
should also be reflected in ways authorities deal with those who 
return. It is useful, then, to revisit some examples of transnational 
activism and consider different types of returnees in order to better 
understand the direct and indirect consequences of desistance,  
re-integration and rehabilitation.
HOW TO DEAL WITH RETURNEESMANY FORMS OF ACTIVISM 
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The immediate reaction to the manner of the defeat, the 
violence against civilians and attacks on hospitals, among these 
communities was one of anger. Major cities such as London, 
Ottawa and Sydney saw large demonstrations, hunger strikes and 
the lobbying of governments to intervene in Sri Lanka to stop 
what placards described as “genocide” against the Tamil people. 
Almost eight years on from the final battles in north-eastern 
Sri Lanka, the anger has not subsided. However, and contrary 
to what many predicted at the time, the response of diasporic 
Tamils has not been resurgent support for the LTTE and armed 
struggle for a separate Tamil state. Rather, the response has been 
a commitment to international and national legal processes 
to chart the future of the island. In our research we seek to 
understand why the political orientation of overseas Tamil 
communities embraced non-violence and placed its faith in 
transitional justice. The answers can be found in Sri Lanka as 
well as in the countries of settlement.
The defeat of the LTTE was total. The military, political and  
civil structures established since the mid-1980s collapsed.  
Tamils in the diaspora had been prepared, or felt that they had 
no choice, to show support for the LTTE during the Civil War. 
With its defeat, the LTTE was shorn of its status as the only 
group able to protect Tamil civilians. It lost the very basis of its 
appeal to Tamils abroad who were worried about friends and 
family at home, or of those who still believed that a separate state 
was achievable and violence might be necessary to accomplish it. 
The LTTE ‘Boys’ previously active in Europe and North America, 
managing the information war and propagating the mystique of 
The Tigers, found that their previously pliant audience  
had evaporated. 
CHRISTOPHER MCDOWELL 
SRI LANKA, 
DIASPORA POLITICS 
AND THE END OF 
VIOLENCE
The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in brutal final battles in May 
2009 reverberated around the world.  
An estimated one million Sri Lankan Tamils 
left the island over the three decades 
following the outbreak of civil conflict in 
1983 settling in Europe, North America, 
Southeast Asia and Australia. 
For the first time there was open discussion about the corruption 
of the organisation, having collected millions of dollars in 
‘voluntary donations’ and through criminal activities, and 
questions were asked about the division of the spoils by former 
leaders with knowledge of the bank accounts.
Even before the defeat, support for the LTTE and the separatist 
cause were waning among overseas Tamils. Over the thirty years 
of asylum, migration and settlement, Tamil communities had 
become more diverse and more representative of the population 
in Sri Lanka in terms of class, caste, and geographic origin. Social 
and cultural institutions were gradually re-established, marriages 
forged together strong families, and success in education and 
business created wealth and a vision for the future. As overseas 
Tamils put behind the asylum and refugee labels and embraced 
citizenship, there was an increasing sense of confidence in what 
it meant to be a Tamil abroad. 
The nationalism of the LTTE, rooted in a centuries old dispute 
about the first settlers on the island, and an ideology reliant on a 
narrow and antagonistic construction of ethnicity and identity, 
chimed less and less with the values of internationalism and 
cosmopolitanism now familiar to second generation Tamils. 
Their new social identity gave them the confidence to challenge 
the politics of the past.
As with all established communities, Tamils in the West who 
trace their heritage to Sri Lanka have elites from the business, 
professional and political world. These campaign for justice, to 
hold those in power to account for past human rights abuses 
and war crimes, and advocate for a constitutional solution to 
the island’s problems. Western governments and international 
institutions engage with elites when pressured to do so. The 
government in Colombo, and indeed the political representatives 
of Tamils in Sri Lanka, remain cautious of the diaspora, wanting 
their investment but fearing them unreliable as allies. 
Faith in a constitutional, justice-based and internationally 
mediated way forward for Sri Lanka remains strong among 
overseas Tamils. However, the risk remains that if the reform, 
truth and justice mechanisms do not deliver and reconciliation 
fails, then frustration among the diaspora will grow and positions 
will likely harden. 
The Sri Lankan case raises interesting broader questions about 
the factors that shape attitudes towards a political cause at home 
held by those who have created a new life elsewhere. This might 
include the preparedness to defend or oppose the use of violence. 
The organisational and resource capacity of a group to 
maintain an international network of supporters with direct 
links to overseas communities, and the ability to control the 
political narrative through the management of propaganda is 
critical. Important also are issues around identity and levels 
of integration in host countries, which affect the ways in 
which diaspora communities receive a rationale for violence, 
and view options for political settlements back home.
Christopher McDowell (City, University of London), Gemma Collantes-
Celador (Cranfield University) and Natasha De Silva (City, University 
of London) are working on a CREST-funded project focusing on  
the role of Tamil diasporic networks in the post-conflict transition  
to peace.
Auschwitz concentration camp
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The Brexit campaign, the election of 
Donald Trump, the rise of extreme 
political parties across Europe, and the 
emergence of fake news on social media 
have all been tightly intertwined with 
conspiracy theories. 
With all the news surrounding conspiracy 
theories, perhaps it is time to take stock 
of what we really know about them. Of 
course, the definition of conspiracy theory 
is itself open to debate. 
I understand conspiracy theories as an 
unofficial account of events that explains 
outcomes through a small group,  
working in secret, against the common 
good. Here are five things social scientists 
have learned about such accounts in the 
last decade.
1  CONSPIRACY THEORIES  
ARE BOTH TIMELY,  
AND TIMELESS
As far back as recorded history goes, 
conspiracy theories have been part of  
the human condition. No age particularly 
stands out as more conspiratorial than 
another. In recent decades, events have 
triggered conspiracy theories focusing 
on the assassination of JFK, the death of 
Princess Diana, and the terror attacks  
of 9/11. 
Before that, there were red scares and 
fears of monopoly trusts, Freemasons, 
and Illuminati. Conspiracy theories are 
alive and well, but there is no reason to 
conclude conspiracy theorising has hit  
an apex. 
2   EVERYBODY BELIEVES  
IN CONSPIRACY  
THEORIES
In the most neutral terms, conspiracy 
theorists are anyone who believes in 
conspiracy theories. We track how 
popular conspiracy theories are with 
opinion polling, but most polls only ask 
about one or a few conspiracy theories.
If pollsters could ask about an unlimited 
number of conspiracy theories, it is likely 
that everyone would express belief in at 
least one if not several. With this said, 
there is heterogeneity: some people 
believe in very few conspiracy theories, 
others have a conspiracy-driven mentality 
and believe in many.  
3  CONSPIRACY THEORIES MUST 
COINCIDE WITH EXISTING 
DISPOSITIONS
There is an assumption that conspiracy 
theories spread now more than ever 
because of the internet. While it is true 
that information can travel farther and 
faster than ever before, it’s not necessarily 
true that conspiracy theories have 
benefited from this more than any other 
type of information has. 
There are many fringe theories skulking 
around the net, but studies of web traffic 
show that few people take an interest.  
The reason is simple: for people to believe 
in a given conspiracy theory, those people 
must not only have a predilection for 
conspiracy theorising, but the theories 
themselves must also harmonise with 
individuals’ other predispositions. 
These include their political party or 
ideology, their racial and religious 
viewpoints, and their other worldviews. 
To wit, Muslims, in very high numbers, 
question the official accounts of the 9/11 
and 7/7 attacks because it is easier for 
them to place the blame for these events 
on a group other than their own. Devout 
Catholics will not believe in DiVinci Code 
theories suggesting that Jesus fathered 
offspring with a prostitute; these beliefs 
resonate better with non-Catholics. 
9/11 Truth theories were only able to 
convince conspiracy-minded Democrats 
in the US; Republicans would not believe 
that President Bush blew up the Twin 
Towers.
There are millions of conspiracy theories 
out there, but most won’t amass much 
following. People are fickle with their 
beliefs and aren’t quick to fall prey to any 
given conspiracy theory. 
4  POWER ASYMMETRIES 
CAN RIPEN CONSPIRACY 
THEORIES
The more we learn about conspiracy 
theories, the more we find that they can 
act as a bellwether, telling us who is afraid 
of who, what, and when. 
They are conjectures about who has 
power and what they do with it when 
no one is looking. Rarely do conspiracy 
theories accuse the weak (e.g., the 
homeless) of conspiring. 
Therefore, accusations of conspiracy 
levied by out-of-power groups against 
in-power groups tend to resonate most 
in society. Groups who feel that they are 
ruled by another will experience anxiety 
due to their perceived powerlessness. 
As a coping mechanism, conspiracy 
theories help out of power groups cope 
with their lowly status, close ranks, 
bealert to potential oncoming dangers, 
and seek redemption. When a group’s 
power increases, the anxiety driving 
the conspiracy theorising subsides. Put 
simply, conspiracy theories are for losers.  
5  CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
CAN HAVE SERIOUS 
CONSEQUENCES
People who are convinced that terrorism 
is a government perpetuated hoax will 
be less supportive of, and less compliant 
with, government initiatives for fighting 
terrorism. Even worse, conspiracy theories 
can lead people to justify violence. 
Which individual conspiracy theorist 
will resort to violence is impossible to 
predict. But which types of people will 
tend towards violent acts is not entirely 
unpredictable. 
Social scientists have learned much about 
those who think in conspiratorial terms; 
two important characteristics are that 
(1) they view conspiring as an acceptable 
means of achieving goals, and (2) they are 
more accepting of violence. People who 
believe powerful groups are out to get 
them will eventually fight fire with fire.  
Joseph E. Uscinski is Associate Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Miami, 
and a co-investigator on a CREST-funded 
project on conspiracy theories. 
JOSEPH E. USCINSKI
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Conspiracy theories help out of power groups cope with their lowly status... 
Put simply, conspiracy theories are for losers.
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There are clearly a myriad of factors 
that determine whether or not a group 
succeeds. What is the most influential?
Interestingly it’s what psychologists 
call ‘sabotage’ — an individual’s 
deviant behaviour, which can come 
in three forms: destruction, where 
deliberate actions impinge on success; 
inaction, where lack of motivation 
affects success; and wastage, where a 
person’s effort is misplaced. Terrorists’ 
erroneous efforts to maintain security 
are a good example of wastage. 
An intervention that enhances  
this behaviour may serve to impede 
group success.
Are there common mistakes people 
make when trying to judge how well a 
team is getting on?
One thing that’s often overlooked 
is the multidimensional nature of 
cooperation and competition among 
group members. It’s very easy to say 
‘these two get on’ or ‘don’t get on’, 
but relationships are richer than 
that. Take conflict. Terrorists within 
a cell may argue about the details 
of their intended attack or they 
may argue about who is in charge. 
Conflicts around task-related issues 
can sometimes help groups be more 
successful. Conflicts around  
relational dynamics rarely help and 
often hinder. 
If I wanted a group to fail, I’d place 
more faith in an intervention that 
caused relationship friction.
IT’S VERY EASY TO SAY 
‘THESE TWO GET ON’ 
OR ‘DON’T GET ON’, BUT 
RELATIONSHIPS ARE RICHER 
THAN THAT
Can we be sure that interventions  
will help groups fail?
No. Disruption can often cause 
more harm than good. What’s often 
forgotten is that, once formed, the 
interpersonal dynamics within a 
group create a ‘stable equilibrium’ in 
performance, regardless of whether or 
not this is optimal. This equilibrium 
is then only punctured when an 
environmental trigger prompts  
a change. 
Interventions on groups who are 
somewhat dysfunctional or functional 
but predictable must therefore be 
considered carefully. The shock 
created by the intervention may 
promote a change that leads to a 
more effective group that is harder  
to investigate.
Will we ever have a nice formula  
for determining how best to disrupt 
a group?
No. But we can use evidence-based 
generalisations to guide planning. 
Some of these have existed for a long 
time. For example, the anthropologist 
Robin Dunbar proposed a theoretical 
‘Dunbar’s number’, which is the 
number of stable interpersonal 
relationships a mammal can maintain 
given its thinking capacity.
In humans it’s believed to be about 
150. Critical to disruption is the 
implication of this theory, which is 
that terrorists with many connections 
will have less cognitive resources to 
use elsewhere. 
It suggests that those at the centre of 
large attack networks are less likely to 
be actors (but may be facilitators); so 
whether they are the primary target 
for an intervention will depend on 
whether you want to disrupt the 
network, or catch the actors.
So being part of a large terrorist group 
is not necessarily a good thing?
That’s exactly right. Indeed, 
psychologists have known this 
about groups for quite some time. 
Small groups tend to build strong 
and deep social ties that create a 
social cohesion that elevates their 
performance. Larger groups struggle 
to maintain this cohesion and sense 
of a singular ‘in-group identity’. 
Indeed, at least in the short term, 
one of the fastest ways to limit 
the productivity of a group is to 
‘merge’ them with another group. 
In this situation, ‘relationships’ and 
‘identities’ need re-negotiating —
though in the longer term the extra 
diversity in skills it brings can make 
for a more effective group.
LASTING CHANGE COMES 
ABOUT FOLLOWING SMALL 
NUDGES (E.G., SEEDS OF 
DOUBT) RATHER THAN  
HARD SHOVES
I recently read something on  
‘nudge theory’. Is that relevant here?
Yes it is. It’s easy to think that the 
best way to disrupt a group is to 
hit it hard. However, there’s a lot 
of evidence to suggest that lasting 
change follows small nudges (e.g., 
suggestions, seeds of doubt) rather 
than hard shoves (e.g., arrest). 
In particular, ‘nudging’ is attractive 
because it appears to be effective 
irrespective of how engrained 
a person’s behaviour is, or how 
developed a group’s cohesion.  
Nudges slowly engender a 
motivational change within the 
person (i.e., they personally make the 
decision to change).
By contrast, changes externally 
imposed on a person are generally 
resisted, or at best they produce 
short-lived differences. 
What’s the primary lesson you  
would like to pass on about  
disrupting groups?
That fear of failure is a major 
inhibitor of goal achievement. 
Ironically, young children often 
outperform adults on novel team 
tasks because they lack this fear. 
Children just ‘try things’ until they 
find something that works. 
From an intervention point of view, 
this means that it may be possible 
to magnify the natural factors that 
impede group progress by enhancing 
the perceptions that people often fail 
(e.g., through rumours).
Paul Taylor is Professor of Psychology 
at Lancaster University, and Director of 
the Centre for Research and Evidence on 
Security Threats.
PAUL TAYLOR 
7 THINGS WORTH KNOWING 
ABOUT GROUPS
We’re all members of groups that we want to succeed. But what if we 
want some groups, like terrorist cells, to fail? We talked to Paul Taylor  
to find out more… 
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